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Do liberal states have a moral duty to admit immigrants? According 
to what has been called the “conventional view”, this question is to 
be answered in the negative. One of the most prominent critics of 
the conventional view is Joseph Carens. In the past 30 years Carens’ 
contributions to the open borders debate have gradually taken on a 
different complexion. This is explained by the varying “ideality” of 
his approaches. Sometimes Carens attempts to figure out what states 
would be obliged to do under otherwise perfectly just conditions 
(i.e., he attempts to establish an ideal). At other times, he is more 
interested in what to do, given the (not fully just) world that we 
actually live in. In my view, the relevance of the ideal/non-ideal 
theory debate to the open borders debate (and the ethics of 
migration more generally) has not yet received sufficient attention. 
My aim in this paper therefore is to show in detail how Carens’ 
varying approaches affect his critique of the conventional view. To 
this effect I analyse three of his papers: “Aliens and Citizens: The 
Case for Open Borders” (1987), “Realistic and Idealistic 
Approaches to the Ethics of Migration” (1996), and “Who Should 
get in? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions” (2003). 
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Do liberal states have a moral duty to admit immigrants? According to 
what has been called the “conventional view”, this question is to be 
answered in the negative. Liberal states do not have a strong duty to admit 
immigrants; or at least they do not have a duty to admit all immigrants. In 
this respect, liberal states have been claimed to resemble clubs (Walzer 
1984, 14-39; see also Wellman 2008). Just as the members of a club may 
award or reject membership based on (almost) any criteria, we should 
consider liberal states to be free to award or deny membership based on 
(almost) any criteria as well. That is, how many immigrants they admit and 
which ones they admit, is (largely) up to them. Michael Walzer, one of the 
conventional view’s main proponents, puts it as follows:  
 
The distribution of membership is not pervasively subject to the 
constraints of justice. Across a considerable range of the decisions 
that are made, states are simply free to take in strangers (or not)—
much as they are free, leaving aside the claims of the needy, to share 
their wealth with foreign friends, to honor the achievements of 
foreign artists, scholars, and scientists, to choose their trading 
partners, and to enter into collective security arrangements with 
foreign states. (Walzer 1984, 61) 
 
The conventional view arguably reflects how most people in Western 
societies think about immigration. Nevertheless, in recent years it has 
provoked strong criticism. Scholars have argued that liberal states do have 
a strong moral duty to admit immigrants; e.g., because this is implied by 
the democratic theory of popular sovereignty (e.g., Abizadeh 2008) or 
because more open borders are a way of compensating for injustices such 
as poverty or human rights violations (e.g., Wilcox 2007).  
 
One of the most prominent critics of the conventional view is Joseph 
Carens. Carens believes that borders should be (far) more open than they 
currently are. His argument for this claim rests on the idea that citizenship, 
though of tremendous influence on people’s prospects of having a fulfilled 
life, is not the result of personal efforts or achievements. It is rather 
something that we are “born into”. If one is lucky, one comes into the world 
within the borders of a state such as Austria. But one may as well be born 
in Bangladesh, or Sudan, or North Korea, and be doomed to a life in 
poverty. This does not seem fair. Thus, for Carens citizenship is “the 
modern equivalent of feudal privilege” (1987; see also, e.g., 1996, 169). 
One prima facie puzzling feature of Carens’ critique of the conventional 
view is that it comes in different degrees, or is situated on different levels. 
In some of his publications Carens rejects the conventional view 
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altogether, advocating radical openings of our borders. On other occasions, 
in contrast, he suggests only minor departures from the status quo, e.g., 
rethinking some of the selection criteria for immigrants. This difference is 
explained by the fact that Carens considers the open borders debate from 
different perspectives. Sometimes he tries to figure out what states would 
be obliged to do under otherwise perfectly just conditions. He tries to 
establish an ideal; something that we can orient ourselves by. At other 
times Carens is more interested in what to do, given the world we live in – 
a world which involves injustices, in which many policies must be 
regarded as infeasible, in which there are limits as to what we can demand 
of people, etc. Put differently, his approach varies in how “ideal” or “non-
ideal” it is (see Valentini 2012).  
 
In my view, the relevance of the ideal/non-ideal theory debate to the open 
borders debate (and the ethics of migration more generally) has not yet 
received sufficient attention. My aim in this paper therefore is to show in 
detail how Carens’ critique of the conventional view puts on a different 
complexion depending on the “ideality” of the approach that he takes. To 
this effect I will analyse three of Carens’ papers. In the second chapter I 
will investigate what is probably his most famous article, “Aliens and 
Citizens: The Case for Open Borders”, dating back to 1987. In the third 
chapter I will analyze Carens’ 1996 article “Realistic and Idealistic 
Approaches to the Ethics of Migration”. Finally, in the fourth chapter, I 
will be concerned with a more recent article entitled “Who Should get in? 
The Ethics of Immigration Admissions” (2003). Before going in medias 
res, however, some words are in order regarding the distinction between 
ideal and non-ideal theory. 
 
 
1. Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory 
 
The distinction between ideal and non-ideal theorizing has been drawn in 
a variety of different ways (e.g. Rawls 1971, 8-9, 244-248; Farelly 2007, 
844; for an overview see Valentini 2012). In “Realistic and Idealistic 
Approaches to the Ethics of Migration” (1996, 157) Carens himself 
provides a definition. In his understanding, ideal and non-ideal theorizing 
differ with respect to how large they allow the “gap” between is and ought 
to be.  
 
According to non-ideal theory (e.g., Farelly 2007; Galston 2010; Gaus 
2017; Horton 2010), the gap between is and ought must not be too big. 
This is because morality is taken to be essentially action-guiding, and if it 
were to prescribe actions which cannot be performed here and now 
(because they demand too much in terms of human psychology, because 
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they are politically infeasible, etc.) then it could not fulfill this function. It 
would miss its point. Ideal theorists (e.g., Cohen 2009; Estlund 2017) reject 
this claim. They believe that what ought to be is widely independent of 
what is, often because of what has been called the problem of “adaptive 
preference formation”. Suppose one allowed empirical facts to restrict 
moral prescriptions in the way non-ideal theorists do. Then, the worry 
goes, we would often be satisfied with too little (in terms of justice); we 
would accept the status quo even if it were somewhat or considerably 
unjust. 
 
Carens illustrates the problem with extremely non-ideal approaches by the 
example of slavery in America of the 17th and 18th century (1996, 164-
165). As slavery was a stable social institution by this time, as there was 
only little emotional identification with the slaves, as slave-owners had a 
strong interest in maintaining things as they were, and as abolishing slavery 
was politically infeasible, non-ideal theorists would be forced to say that 
slavery was morally permissible. But this conclusion is unacceptable. 
Thus, ideal theorists argue, philosophers need not (or only somewhat) be 
concerned with actual empirical facts. Moral considerations should be 
guided by ideals; they should be about what is possible under ideal (rather 
than actual) circumstances. 
 
In the following quote Farelly summarizes the main problems of each of 
the two approaches, both the ideal and the non-ideal one:  
 
At the extreme of fact-insensitivity (what we can call extreme ideal 
theory), one runs the risk of invoking an account of justice that fails 
to function as an adequate guide for our collective action in the real, 
non-ideal world. At the opposite end of the spectrum is the danger 
that all existing constraints (even those imposed by an unjust social 
structure) are taken as legitimate constraints and thus justice simply 
reaffirms the status quo (Farelly 2007, 846). 
 
By speaking of “extremes” and of the “ends of a spectrum”, Farelly’s quote 
points to an important qualification. Only few philosophers (but see, e.g., 
Cohen 2009 for the ideal side) advocate ideal or non-ideal theorizing in 
their extreme forms. Commonly, what is claimed is not that empirical facts 
restrict moral prescriptions in the sense of strictly determining them or that 
empirical facts do not have any implications for the validity of moral 
prescriptions at all, but rather that the ought depends on the is to a certain 
(smaller or larger) degree. Thus, on most of the accounts that have been 
proposed, and certainly on the account that is assumed here, the distinction 
between ideal and non-ideal theory is best thought of as a spectrum 
(Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012; Mason 2004; Valentini 2012). 
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Discussions about ideal and non-ideal theory have often focused on which 
level of analysis is the most appropriate one (see, e.g., Cohen 2009; Farelly 
2007). When we reason about justice or morality in general should we take 
a more ideal or a more non-ideal approach? Some philosophers have 
suggested, however, that each of these levels of analysis is legitimate. They 
do not exclude but rather complement each other. For some purposes more 
ideal and for other purposes more non-ideal approaches are appropriate 
(e.g. Hamlin and Stemplowska 2012; Mason 2004; Rawls 1971; Valentini 
2012). This is the view Carens subscribes to — and that I find most 
plausible — as well.  
 
In “Realistic and idealistic approaches to the ethics of migration” (1996, 
168-169) Carens explicitly claims that regarding questions of migration 
there is no such thing as a correct degree of idealization. If one is interested 
in establishing action-guiding prescriptions one should look at things from 
a non-ideal perspective. If one’s aim is to evaluate certain institutions or 
practices or to establish long-term goals, in contrast, an ideal approach is 
more appropriate: 
 
[…] what is at stake here is more a matter of differing sensibilities 
and strategies of inquiry than of logically incompatible positions. 
[…] Each approach has something important to contribute to the 
ethics of migration. (Carens 1996, 156-157) 
 
Ultimately what is needed is a full range of reflections, each self-
conscious and explicit about its own purposes and presuppositions. 
There is no uniquely satisfying perspective on the ethics of 
migration. (Carens 1996, 169) 
 
This is a very important point for understanding Carens’ work. As 
mentioned, he has looked at the open borders debate both from ideal and 
non-ideal perspectives. One may be led to think that this is explained by 
revision, i.e., by the fact that Carens first considered ideal approaches to 
be more appropriate, but later came to the conclusion that it is better to take 
a non-ideal stance. However, in light of the above remarks this might not 
be true. Carens seems to believe that each of the different levels of analysis 
has its merits. Each of them helps us to gain a better understanding of what 








2. Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders 
 
“Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” marks the beginning of 
Carens’ engagement with the ethics of migration. Carens’ perspective in 
this article is mostly the perspective of extreme ideal theory. What he is 
interested in is not what states are morally obliged to do, given the 
circumstances that actually obtain (although such considerations play some 
role in his discussion of Rawls). The paper is rather about justice in an ideal 
sense. 
 
From a largely ideal point of view the conventional view turns out to be 
wrong, according to Carens. Liberal states do have a moral duty to admit 
immigrants, and they have this duty not only with respect to some of their 
would-be citizens, but with respect to nearly all of them. Put differently, 
Carens believes that borders should be widely open: “[…] borders should 
generally be open and […] people should normally be free to leave their 
country of origin and settle in another, subject only to the sorts of 
constraints that bind current citizens in their new country” (1987, 251).1 
 
Carens considers what he takes to be the three main approaches to political 
theory: property rights theories, John Rawls’ theory of justice, and 
utilitarianism. He attempts to show that each of these theories implies his 
above claim, i.e., that borders should be much more open than they 
currently are. 
 
2.1. Property Rights Theories 
 
In arguing for the conventional view people often stress the fact that the 
state they are citizens of is their state. This might be interpreted as an 
appeal to property rights, or more specifically, to collective property rights. 
A state, the argument goes, is the citizens’ collective property. In some 
sense it is owned by them. Therefore, the citizens can exclude whomever 
they want. 
 
Is this line of reasoning convincing? Does an appeal to property rights 
really lend support to the conventional view? Carens denies that this is 
actually the case. In particular, he attempts to refute the above argument 
by the example of the most prominent contemporary proponent of property 
rights theory, namely Robert Nozick (1974).  
                                                 
1 For more recent arguments for open borders, see Abizadeh (2008) and Wilcox 
(2007). For objections against Carens’ arguments, see Blake (2005) and Miller 
(2005).  
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Nozick starts from the assumption that people have certain natural rights, 
including the rights to acquire and use property and to enter into voluntary 
exchanges. Moreover, he assumes that the sole purpose of the state is to 
protect people on a certain territory from violations of these rights. On such 
a view, Carens argues, states do not have a right to restrict immigration 
(1987, 253-254). Suppose a US farmer hires a Mexican worker. Since this 
is a voluntary exchange, the state must not prevent the farmer and the 
worker from doing so; it is even obliged to protect their right against other 
people’s interferences. But suppose the Mexican worker does not have any 
job offer. Is Nozick’s minimal state at least justified in excluding him under 
these circumstances? No, Carens argues. As long as the Mexican does not 
violate the natural rights of other individuals the state must not exclude 
him in this case either. On Nozick’s account, who enters a state is none of 
the state’s business. It exclusively depends on the individuals living within 
the state’s borders. They can admit and exclude whomever they want, 
citizen or non-citizen. The state, however, is not justified in restricting 
immigration. 
 
2.2. Rawls’ Theory of Justice 
 
In “A Theory of Justice” (1971) Rawls explicitly distinguishes between 
ideal and non-ideal approaches to justice. Although Rawls himself does 
not discuss questions of immigration (starting from his assumptions they 
simply do not arise), Carens believes that his theory can be expanded to 
cover such issues.  
 
Rawls attempts to justify his principles of justice by reference to a 
hypothetical and ahistoric formation of a contract. The terms of this 
contract are negotiated behind a “veil of ignorance”, i.e., the parties of the 
contract do not have knowledge about their class, their sex, their race, their 
goals and so on. Carens (1987, 256) argues that one’s citizenship should 
also be among the things that are covered by the “veil of ignorance”. After 
all, citizenship is exactly one of those contingent features Rawls attempted 
to get rid of to promote impartiality.  
 
According to Carens, the “veiling” of one’s citizenship would not affect 
the general terms of the contract. The parties would still agree on the 
principles set out by Rawls: the first principle that guarantees an equal set 
of basic liberties for all people; and the second principle, according to 
which social and economic inequalities are justified only if they are to the 
greatest benefit of the worst-off and the positions attached to them are open 
to all people under fair conditions. That said, the basic liberties of the first 
principle would now also involve the principle of freedom of movement 
between states. This is because even under ideal conditions people can 
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have reason to migrate from one country to another. They can fall in love 
with a citizen of a foreign country; they may want to migrate for economic 
or religious reasons; and so on. Since the parties of the hypothetical 
contract ex hypothesi reason from the perspective of those that are made 
worst-off by a restriction they would therefore agree that the right to 
migrate should be one of the basic liberties (Carens 1987, 259-262). 
 
The above holds true, according to Carens, even if we take into 
consideration a qualification made by Rawls. Rawls maintains that a 
liberty may be restricted if it threatens public order and thus other liberties. 
At first sight it might seem as if an unrestricted right to migrate inevitably 
threatens public order. However, Carens argues that this is actually very 
unlikely. Under ideal circumstances citizens would not protest against just 
regulations and states would be just as well (which means that the 
likelihood of mass migration would be low).  
 
In addition, Carens (1987) points out that Rawls himself recommended 
great caution in applying the above “public order restriction”. Starting 
from his non-ideal theory (where historical contingencies and actual 
injustices are taken into account) at least some restrictions on immigration 
turn out to be justified. Carens (1987) considers three cases: first, the case 
of people who aim at overthrowing just institutions; second, the case of 
mass immigration into one state; and third, the case in which the right of 
freedom of movement is restricted for the sake of economic gains. 
 
According to Carens, in the first and in the second case some restrictions 
on immigration are justifiable. Both people threatening national security 
and mass immigration have the potential to lead to a breakdown of public 
order. In the third case, restrictions may be justifiable in principle. In ideal 
theory Rawls grants basic liberties priority over social and economic gains. 
This “lexical priority” is weakened in non-ideal theory, however. If the 
economic gains at issue benefit the worst-off and promote justice, Rawls 
allows them to override basic liberties for some time. Carens (1987, 262-
263) argues, however, that these conditions are probably not sufficiently 
met in the case of restricting immigration. First, it is not clear how 
restricting immigration should benefit the worst-off. It seems, to the 
contrary, that immigration itself in many cases benefits the worst-off 
economically. Second, even if the first point did not hold, we would very 
likely have more effective means of improving the situation of the worst-
off than by restricting immigration. 
 
To sum up Carens’ interpretation, Rawls’ ideal theory implies that states 
are not justified in restricting immigration and that, consequently, open 
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borders should be our long-term goal. Non-ideal theory implies that 




According to utilitarianism, the moral rightness of an action depends on its 
contributing to the maximization of utility (defined, e.g., as pleasure, 
preferences or interests). At first sight, restrictions on immigration may 
seem justified on utilitarian grounds. After all, do not at least some citizens 
suffer economically from immigrants entering their state? 
 
In response to this argument, Carens points out that according to 
utilitarianism, “everyone is to count for one and no one for more than one” 
(1987, 263). This means that not only the utility of some of the state’s 
current citizens has to be taken into consideration, but the utility of all of 
its citizens and, even more importantly, all aliens as well. Since there are 
probably citizens who benefit from more open borders, since there are 
surely very many aliens who do so, and since the free mobility of labour is 
said to be to everyone’s economic advantage, restrictions do not seem 
justified from a utilitarian point of view either. Restrictions may only be 
justified, Carens argues, if one takes into consideration certain 
unreasonable, shortsighted or evil pleasures or displeasures (like the fear 
of one’s culture becoming suppressed or racial prejudice). Even under this 
(supposedly wrongheaded) assumption, however, the restrictions would 
only be minor compared to those that are actually in place (Carens 1987, 
263-264). 
 
Since significant restrictions on immigration can be justified on neither 
property rights theories, nor Rawlsian, nor utilitarian grounds, Carens 
concludes that it is very unlikely that the conventional view is true. States 
do have a moral duty to admit immigrants. Borders should be far more 




3. Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration 
 
“Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration” focuses 
explicitly on the distinction between ideal and non-ideal theorizing. In this 
way, the article differs from most of Carens’ other publications. Instead of 
arguing for a particular conclusion regarding the open borders debate, 
Carens is rather interested in what conclusions might be implied by taking 
more ideal or more non-ideal approaches, and how one should conceive of 
the relation between ideal and non-ideal theorizing. 
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3.1. Empirical Restrictions 
According to non-ideal theory, moral prescriptions are restricted by 
empirical facts. This raises the question of what kinds of empirical facts 
are relevant. With respect to the ethics of migration, Carens (1996, 158) 
argues that the most important kinds of facts are (1) institutional, (2) 
behavioural and (3) political facts. 
 
The most significant institutional restriction is claimed to arise from the 
existence of a system of sovereign and independent states. According to 
Carens, this system is so firmly established that if moral prescriptions 
require substantial departures from it then they cannot function to guide 
our actions: “An ethics of migration that requires abolition or even radical 
transformation of the state system is not a morality that can help us to 
determine what is to be done in practice” (Carens 1996, 159). One 
implication of this acknowledgment of the modern state system is that one 
also has to acknowledge states’ sovereignty with regard to immigration. 
One has to acknowledge that states have the authority to exclude aliens, or 
at least most aliens, as they like (Carens 1996, 159-160). 
 
The second kind of facts that should be taken into consideration within 
non-ideal approaches to the ethics of migration are facts about human 
behaviour. According to Carens, moral prescriptions must not be too 
demanding. They must not prescribe what most people most of the time 
are unable to do, or cannot be realistically expected to do. With respect to 
the open borders debate this means, e.g., that states cannot be judged by 
standards such as admitting all refugees that seek asylum. Such a standard 
would simply be too ambitious. It would place too big of a burden on the 
state and its citizens (Carens 1996, 158-159). 
 
The third kind of restriction Carens discusses in “Realistic and Idealistic 
Approaches to the Ethics of Migration” are political restrictions. From a 
non-ideal point of view morality should confine itself to politically feasible 
prescriptions. Opening all gates between all states may be a noble ideal, 
but policies such as this do not have a chance of being implemented. On 
non-ideal accounts elaborating them and discussing them appears to be a 
waste of time (Carens 1996, 159-160). Furthermore, one has to keep in 
mind the risk of a backlash against immigrants and refugees by the current 
citizens of a state. If restrictions on immigration are weakened, citizens can 
easily get the impression that borders are “out of control” and demand 
regulations that are even harsher than the prior ones in force.  
 
One might argue that such a reaction is unjust, or racist, or unreasonable. 
But that’s beside the point, according to Carens (1996, 160): “There is no 
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point in wasting time considering whether the popular reaction is racist or 
whether the politicians might be able to prevent such a reaction if they 
expended vast amounts of political capital to do so.” This stands in stark 
contrast to Carens’ view in “Aliens and Citizens”, as discussed in the 
previous section. Looking at the issue from an idealistic perspective, 
Carens there argued that “evil pleasures” or “evil reactions” should not be 
taken into consideration in determining what we morally ought to do (see 
his discussion of utilitarianism). 
 
3.2.  Considerations about Effectiveness 
 
In addition to the above three restrictions, Carens argues that the strength 
of our moral obligations is also affected by their effectiveness. Having 
effects — being action-guiding — is what morality is all about, according 
to the non-ideal approach. So the less effective a moral prescription is, the 
weaker it should be considered to be. What makes moral prescriptions 
effective? Carens (1998, 160) discusses three kinds of preconditions.  
 
The first precondition is psychological. In order for morality to be 
effective, there has to be some kind of emotional identification with the 
moral subject. The stronger the emotional identification is, the more 
effective and thus the stronger our moral obligations are. Since people 
typically identify more strongly with citizens of their own country than 
with aliens, this means that we have stronger moral obligations towards the 
former than the latter. The state is morally justified to weigh the interests 
of its citizens higher than the interests of those who want to become part 
of the state (Carens 1996, 160-161). 
 
The second precondition for an effective morality is sociological. Carens 
points out that moral prescriptions are most effective when they correspond 
to our long-term interests. Thus, on non-ideal accounts one cannot demand 
that people continuously act against what they regard as being best for 
them in the long run (that they are “saints” or “heroes”). The clearer a 
moral prescription counteracts people’s long-term interests, the weaker it 
is. For example, giving half of our wealth to the migrants and refugees of 
the world is something that morality just cannot demand on non-ideal 
accounts (Carens 1996, 161-163). 
 
Finally, Carens discusses an “epistemological” precondition. From an 
epistemological point of view, he argues, morality is most effective if it 
corresponds to our local moral knowledge: to people’s common beliefs 
about right and wrong. The assumption that states are widely free to admit 
or exclude aliens is supposed to be part of this knowledge. It is reflected 
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both by our practices and principles. So on a non-ideal account there is no 
point in demanding to depart from this view (Carens 1996, 163-164). 
 
Although Carens repeatedly emphasizes that non-ideal approaches do not 
rule out any criticism of the prevailing circumstances whatsoever, it is easy 
to see that the account he describes yields a morality that stands in stark 
contrast to his view in “Aliens and Citizens”. If we take the above 
restrictions and preconditions into account, the conventional view turns out 
to be quite correct: states do not have a strong moral duty to admit 
immigrants.  
 
Looking at things from an ideal perspective, however, Carens (1996, 169) 
still seems to believe that the conventional view turns out to be false and 
that borders should be more open than they currently are. After all, in this 
case the above restrictions and preconditions do not have to be taken into 
account. The question is not how migration should be regulated, given that 
the world is divided into nation states, given that people behave and think 
in certain ways, etc., but how migration should be regulated ideally, i.e., in 
an otherwise just world. 
 
As pointed out above, in this paper Carens neither argues in favour of the 
non-ideal nor in favour of the ideal approach. He believes that both 
perspectives have their strengths and weaknesses. “Each approach has 
something important to contribute to our understanding of the ethics of 
migration. Yet I think that each approach typically brings one set of 
concerns into focus and simultaneously screens another from view” 
(Carens 1996, 157). The strength of the non-ideal approach is its relevancy. 
It is able to tell us what to do here and now. However, as explained, such 
an approach also tends to legitimize the current circumstances, even if they 
are (somewhat) unjust (Carens 1996, 164-165). The strength of the ideal 
approach is that it does not have this tendency. It is less tied to the current 
circumstances, and thus has more critical potential (Carens 1996, 166-
167). Carens argues, however, that the idealistic approach suffers from a 
number of problems as well.  
 
First, by taking an idealistic approach one’s focus often shifts from the 
actual problem to very fundamental questions. One starts discussing the 
ethics of migration but ends up thinking about what a just world order 
would look like in general — a question that is (a) largely independent 
from the ethics of migration and (b) very hard to answer (Carens 1996, 
167). Second, even if one succeeded in figuring out what a just world order 
would look like this would not tell us how to get from our current non-
ideal circumstances to the ideal. This transition is not always 
straightforward. It is not necessarily most effective to change the actual 
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circumstances in such a way that they are closer to the ideal (in an 
absolutely just world borders may be open; that does not mean, however, 
that the fastest or best way to open borders is starting to open borders here 
and now) (Carens 1996, 168). Third, by looking at migration from an ideal 
perspective a number of important problems disappear from view. For 
example, in an absolutely just world there would not be any refugees 
(refugees are per definitionem the product of unjust circumstances) 
(Carens 1996, 168). 
 
 
4. Who Should Get in? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions 
 
In “Who Should Get in? The Ethics of Immigration Admissions” Carens 
approaches the open borders debate from the perspective of extreme (or 
rather extreme) non-ideal theory. The non-ideal circumstances that are 
taken into consideration are mainly institutional and behavioural ones. 
Carens presupposes that the world is divided into sovereign and 
independent states and that these states have a “broad sovereign right to 
control immigration” (2003, 95). Furthermore, he also grants the way in 
which states actually exercise this right. 
 
Strikingly, and in contrast to what is suggested in “Realistic and Idealistic 
Approaches to the Ethics of Migration”, Carens comes to the conclusion 
that on such an approach the conventional view does not turn out to be 
right (2003, 95, 110). According to the conventional view, states’ right to 
control immigration implies that the admission and exclusion of 
immigrants is not a moral issue. In fact, however, most states do treat 
immigration as a moral issue. Most importantly, almost all liberal 
democratic states acknowledge that they are morally obliged to admit 
immigrants in at least two cases: (1) in cases in which the immigrants are 
immediate family members of current citizens and residents, and (2) in the 
case of refugees. 
 
4.1. Family Reunion 
 
First, Carens points out that almost all liberal democratic states grant 
admission to current citizens’ immediate family members, such as their 
children or spouses. This is true even for states that are known for strict 
immigration policies, and in many cases it is true not only for current 
citizens, but even for non-citizen residents (e.g., students, visiting 
professionals, or visiting workers) (Carens 2003, 96). 
 
What is the reason for this generosity? Carens (2003, 96) argues that the 
reason is a felt moral obligation from the side of states and their 
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representatives. States feel that they have a moral obligation to admit the 
immediate family members of their current citizens and residents. The 
obligation is felt not towards the outside family members, Carens (2003, 
97) suggests. In this case it would be unclear why those people should be 
given priority over, e.g., people in extreme poverty. Rather, the obligation 
is supposed to be one towards the citizens or residents of the state itself. 
States consider themselves under an obligation to take into account the 
vital interests of their citizens and (in many cases) residents. Family 
reunion clearly exemplifies a vital interest. People’s quality of life can be 
significantly impaired by being separated from their children, parents or 
siblings. Thus, most liberal democratic states ensure that citizens and 
residents can get their immediate family members to join them. 
 
It might be objected that family reunions can take place not only within a 
given state, but outside of it as well. Each citizen and resident has a right 
to leave. So instead of his/her family joining him/her the citizen or resident 
could go to wherever his/her family currently lives as well (given that s/he 
will be admitted there). Does not this cast doubt on there being a moral 
right to family reunion? Carens responds by pointing out that citizens and 
residents do not only have a vital interest in family reunion, but a vital 
interest to continue living where they have lived as well. The state has to 
take this preference into account, and thus cannot shake off its obligation 
to admit the immediate family members of current citizens and residents 




The second case in which most liberal democratic states acknowledge that 
they are under a moral obligation to admit immigrants is the case of 
refugees. One can distinguish between two kinds of refugees: (1) refugees 
that have been determined to be refugees by the UN High Commissioner 
for Refugees, and (2) asylum seekers, i.e., people who directly turn to the 
states they want to immigrate to and are selected by these countries (Carens 
2003, 99-100). 
 
In the case of refugees determined by the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees, states normally do not consider themselves to be under a moral 
obligation to admission. Resettlement refugees have already found a safe 
place outside their home country. Thus, given states’ broad right to control 
immigration, there does not seem to be a duty to admit them. States that do 
so (Carens mentions Canada and Sweden as countries that have admitted 
particularly many refugees in recent years, and the US as the leader in 
absolute numbers) certainly deserve praise. But states that do not, must not 
be blamed (Carens 2003, 100). 
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In the case of asylum seekers states’ right to control immigration is 
restricted legally. According to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees and its 1967 protocol (signed by all European and 
North American states), people claiming to be refugees have a right to be 
heard by the state they want to immigrate to, and if their claim turns out to 
be correct, they have a right to stay. Carens (2003, 101) argues that this 
regulation is based on a moral obligation. In addition to their legal rights, 
asylum seekers also have a moral right to be heard, and if determined to be 
refugees, to stay. Unlike refugees, these people cannot simply be sent back 
to where they came from. In their home country they are in danger of being 
tortured or killed. According to Carens (2003, 102), states thus have a 
“deep moral obligation towards asylum seekers”. 
 
In addition to the cases of family reunion and refugees, Carens points out 
that, in some sense, states also treat ordinary cases of immigration as moral 
issues, i.e., cases in which the people who want to immigrate do not have 
any special rights to be admitted. States commonly consider themselves to 
be free to admit and exclude as many of these people as they like. However, 
they do not consider themselves to be free to do so on the basis of just any 
criteria. In particular, they believe that it would not be morally permissible 
for them to choose people on the basis of discriminatory criteria, giving 
preference, for example, to a certain sex, or a certain race (Carens 2003, 
103-110).  
 
One of the things Carens’ article demonstrates quite clearly, and that was 
also emphasized in “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of 
Migration” (1996, 159), is that even a non-ideal approach allows for at 
least some degree of criticism. Carens does not approve of any aspect of 
the status quo. He acknowledges that liberal democratic states do 
sometimes determine admission and exclusion on the basis of 
discriminatory criteria. For example, he criticizes Germany’s Aussiedler 
policy which gives preference to people of a certain ethnicity (2003, 109-
110). He also criticises some other practices regarding immigration, e.g., 
the US’ giving higher priority to citizens than to non-citizen residents with 
regard to the admission of immediate family members (2003, 98) or long 
waiting periods for the admission of children and spouses from some parts 
of the world in Canada (2003, 99). 
 
This critical potential allows Carens to reject the conventional view even 
based on his non-ideal approach in “Who Should Get in? The Ethics of 
Immigration Admissions”. According to the conventional view, states do 
not have a moral duty to admit immigrants. In fact, however, states behave 
as if they had such a duty. Although it is often politically unpopular and 
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economically disadvantageous, they admit immediate family members and 
refugees and try to act morally correct in cases of ordinary immigration as 
well. This demonstrates, according to Carens, that the conventional view 
turns out to be wrong from a non-ideal perspective as well: 
 
The conventional view is that acceptance of the state’s broad general 
right to control immigration means that morality has little role to 
play with regard to admissions. […] In practice, however, liberal 
democratic states do not treat their admissions decisions as morally 
unfettered. […] Even a minimalist account of the moral limits 
widely accepted by liberal democratic states imposes much greater 
restrictions on the states’ discretion with regard to immigration than 
the conventional view allows. (Carens 2003, 95) 
 
 
5.  Concluding remarks 
 
In the past 30 years Joseph Carens’ contributions to the open borders 
debate have gradually taken on a different complexion. Starting at an 
extremely ideal level of analysis, Carens has become more and more 
concerned about what we ought to do under current non-ideal 
circumstances. The three articles analyzed in this paper reflect this shift 
quite clearly. 
 
In “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders” (1987) Carens looks 
at the open borders debate from the perspective of ideal theory. He is 
interested in how immigration ought to be regulated in a perfectly just 
world. In “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the Ethics of Migration” 
(1996), both the idealistic and the non-idealistic approach are discussed, 
with Carens suggesting that both perspectives are important, and that they 
complement rather than exclude each other. In “Who Should Get in? The 
Ethics of Immigration Admissions” (2003), finally, Carens examines the 
open borders debate at an extremely non-ideal level of analysis.  
 
The common thread that runs through all of these works is Carens’ 
opposition to the conventional view regarding immigration (the view that 
liberal states do not have a strong duty to admit immigrants; or at least, 
they do not have a duty to admit all immigrants). Understandably, this 
opposition manifests itself most clearly in “Aliens and Citizens”, where 
empirical realities are hardly taken into consideration at all. However, 
contrary to what is predicted in “Realistic and Idealistic Approaches to the 
Ethics of Migration”, the opposition is even present in the non-ideal 
analysis of “Who Should Get in?”. 
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The aim of this paper was mainly illustrative. In closing, however, let me 
also make two brief critical remarks: one that pertains to Carens’ critique 
of the conventional view, and one that pertains to ethical debates about 
open borders more generally. 
 
First, it seems to me that some of Carens’ arguments rest on a slight 
misrepresentation of their target, i.e., the conventional view. He suggests 
that the conventional view does not only attribute little role to morality 
with regard to admissions, but almost, or even literally, none. In “Aliens 
and Citizens”, for example, the conventional view is introduced as the view 
that states “[…] may choose to be generous in admitting immigrants, but 
they are under no [sic!] obligation to do so” (1987, 251). But only few 
philosophers have held the conventional view in such an extreme form. In 
particular, this is not how the view was defended by the philosopher who 
has been Carens’ main target, namely Michael Walzer. In “Spheres of 
Justice” (1984, 41) Walzer explicitly notes that states can be compared to 
families, and that they thus have at least some moral obligation to admit 
family members of current citizens and, in some cases, displaced ethnic 
nationals. Moreover, Walzer (1984, 33) concedes that there is a moral 
obligation to admit refugees seeking asylum (Wilcox 2009, 2-3).  
 
Second, while my focus in this paper was on Carens, its conclusions are 
supposed to apply more widely. In the end any philosopher’s stance on the 
debate about open borders (and the ethics of migration more generally) is 
influenced by the ideality of his or her approach. This methodological 
insight has not yet received sufficient attention. While Carens himself is 
admiringly aware of it, other participants of the debate have (largely) failed 
to realize that their claims are contingent on the extent to which they 
account for empirical facts. Hopefully, my considerations show that the 
fundamental question of how ideal or non-ideal one’s approach should be 
cannot simply be bracketed. Discussions about liberal states’ duties with 
regard to immigration will benefit much from making underlying ideality-
assumptions explicit, and from assessing them in ways similar to those 
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